I shall talk
today about the fate of the Categories in Lutheran Denmark in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, but it should be understood that the story would not be
significantly different if I had chosen a Northern German Lutheran principality
instead.
Three major
forces influenced developments in the sixteenth century: scholastic tradition,
humanism and Lutheranism. Two of these were fundamentally anti-scientific.
Most of
Northern Europe was only just beginning to be influenced by renaissance humanism
at the time of the Lutheran reformation. Lorenzo Valla’s ranting attacks on the
ten categories and much else in traditional logic will have been known by very
few. Some more probably knew of Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica,
which had appeared in print in 1515, thirty years after the author’s death.
Agricola’s preference for topical argumentation over demonstration was to exert
a deep influence on developments in the North.
Valla’s and Agricola’s humanistic line was further developed by Petrus
Ramus in the 1540s-60s. Ramus tried to replace both ordinary logic and
metaphysics with a jejune logic founded on a set of elementary topical
relations. By the 1580s Ramism reached Denmark.
The Lutheran
reformation was, among other things, an anti-philosophical movement. Luther was
deeply suspicious of all branches of philosophy, and Melanchthon of some
branches. Metaphysics, in particular, could have no place in a genuinely
Christian education, they both agreed.
Melanchthon ran
the reformed university of Wittenberg, and he was the man who laid down the
rules for university education in all Lutheran lands. When Denmark went
Lutheran in 1536, the king invited Melanchthon to come and reorganize the
university of Copenhagen, but he had to content himself with one of
Melanchthon’s assistents by the name of Bugenhagen.
According to the new statutes, the University was to have just two philosophical chairs, one in dialectic and one in natural philosophy. The dialectician was required to spend quite a bit of his time on rhetoric and Roman poetry, but his main job was to teach Melanchthon’s Erotemata dialectices, [1] and so dialectician after dialectician did until the end of the sixteenth century, though the last ones to do so obviously were very tired of being obliged to use the book. Strangely, it was left for the professor of natural philosophy to give a weekly lesson on Aristotle’s logic.[2] In practice, it seems that the dialecticus soon took over that job.
So let me start with a look at Melanchthon’s work.
Melanchthon defined dialectic as the art of teaching in the right way, orderly, and clearly.[3] Dialectic is to be applied to all matters that men ought to be taught (514), and it only differs from rhetoric in its lack of embellishment of the argumentation (515). Though he does not say so explicitly, the book makes it amply clear that the sort of teaching he is really thinking of is the teaching of Christianity. Melanchthonian universities were seminaries with the purpose of breeding Lutheran pastors.
Melanchthon thought Agricola’s De inventione dialectica was a good book, but he also thought that some acquaintance with the categories and other parts of traditional logic might be useful to a pastor.
His approach to the subject is influenced by late-medieval nominalism in that he holds that universals are words[4] and underlines that everything that is, is eo ipso singular.[5] He also holds that a universal is a mental act that paints a picture which is common in the sense that someone carrying it around in his mind can apply it to several individuals after having made a comparison between each individual and the mental picture. Such a mental act or the picture – he is not consistent on this point – is what Aristotle called a species and Plato an idea. Melanchthon provides no explanation of the relation between the concepts and the corresponding words.
A category is defined as “a series (ordo) of genera and species under one most general item, which signifies either substance or accident”, and, he continues,[6]
The whole table containing the categories is a brief table of the totality of things <and> distributes substances and the accidents of substances. If we were to unfold the categories completely, we whould have to talk about all parts of nature. Now we just recite the naked list of words, which, however, is useful because thus we learn the limits within which all thought must be kept, so that, namely, we start from the highest word ‘being’ (ens), and then consider the various natures as its branches, as it were, and ask about the thing in front of us whether it is a substance or an accident, and in which branch of substances or accidents it should be put.
So, the list of categories is one of the ways in which we can, and must, conceptualize the world’s constituent parts. However often Melanchthon speaks of the categories as words, he assumes a strong ontological foundation. Nor is he bothered by the equivocity of being. Having listed the categories he says:[7]
They are called most general, i.e., highest, genera because from them one goes straight to the word that is the first of all in the nature of things, being, that is.
And his first piece of information about substance is:[8]
A substance is a being (ens) that truly has a being (esse) of its own and is not in anything else so that it owes its being to its subject. This definition is common to God and created substances.
Because of the difficulty of understanding God, we may, however, use a narrower definition for ordinary purposes, viz.[9]
A substance is a being (ens) that has a being (esse) of its own and supports accidents.
Concerning each category Melanchthon finds something to say of relevance to Christian teaching. Thus the fact that mental habits are a species of quality occasions a long excursus on virtues and vices, secular as well as theological.
Melanchthon’s treatment of relations contains many medieval features, starting with a distinction between absolute names and relative ones, the absolute being those that signify substances, quantities or qualities,[10] and later introducing the distinctions between relativa secundum dici and secundum esse[11] and between real relations and relations of reason.[12]
Perhaps the most interesting part of the whole chapter is his the treatment of relational entities that are not natural but introduced by human institution or divine will, such as a border-post or a schoolmaster (scholasticus),[13] in the former case the foundation is a stone, in a latter a person, but they are what they are in virtue of their directedness towards their respective termini. I know of no medieval precedence for this type of relativa. One remark made in passing also deserves to be noticed:[14]
Traditionally, schoolmen have called the following words transcendent, because they are common to many caterogirs: ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘true’, ‘good’. But true and good rightly belong among the relatives.
We are offered no explanation why this
is so, but the reason seems to be that ‘good’ and ‘true’ indicate a relation to
the divine measuring rod.
One notable feature of Melanchthon’s chapter on categories is the complete absence of the antepredicaments. He does not even offer an excuse for omitting them.[15] The postpredicaments are treated, but he seems unhappy with Aristotle’s apparently arbitrary choice of a few ambiguous words – ‘opposite’ etc. – at the expense of others.[16]
Very little is preserved of whatever the Copenhagen professors may have sritten in the decades after the reformation. By the late 1570s sources begin to be available, and by then Peter Ramus was beginning to exert considerable influence on several professors, as he was to continue to do until about 1620, though few dared openly profess their allegiance to the heretic idol – he was a Calvinist, you know. Generally, the Danish crypto-Ramists contented themselves with placing the doctrine of the topics immediately after that of the categories, but some went further.
One of the early Danish Ramists, Jacob Madsen took upon him to demonstrate what Ramus’ lex iustitiæ meant for logic, which only deals with matters of mind and reason. The Ramist law of justice required of homogeneity for each discipline, any scientific proposition belongs in just one discipline and only propositions with the right sort of mutual coherence belong together. For the lore of the Categories, this meant that the antepredicaments should be left to grammar, and while certain of the single categories really pertain to theology, physics, geometry or some other discipline, the general system belongs to no particular discipline, and so not to logic: [17]
A category is nothing but an classification of homogeneous things by most general, subaltern and most special. But this classification of things is not particular to dialectic, for such a kategoría and classificaton of things is nothing but art in general. For art is nothing but the method, gathering, disposition and ordering of homogeneous things by genus, subalternate and most special genera. For in this way Arithmetic is the correctly ordered kategoria of numbers, and geometry the correctly orderes kategoría of magnitudes.”
Accordingly, professor Madsen praises Agricola for having omitted the categories in his dialectic.[18]
As so often with the Ramists, Madsen’s attack on the categories is an almost verbatim quotation of their great idol.
The word ‘classification’ in my
translation renders descriptio.
But soon people were to talk about the categories as classes.
One of the last Copenhagen professors of dialectic to use Melanchthon was Resen, who held the job in the 1590s. In the form of a series of disputations he developed an elementary handbook of logic of his own. Resen lived at a time when Ramism, while strong in some protestant countries was beginning to be replaced by a new Aristotelianism in Wittenberg and other leading Lutheran universities. The Neoaristotelian wave was motivated first and foremost by the wish to be able to discuss with Jesuits without falling through for lack of training in metaphysics and logic. The Lutherans were not afraid of learning from their enemies, so Suarez became much read, and in logic the new Aristotelianism took its cue from the somewhat Averroistic Paduan professor Zabarella and his De natura logicæ, which had appeared in 1578.
Resen is a transitory figure between the 16th century and Neoaristotelianism. His treatment of the categories contains some loans from Melanchthon, but none of any real significance. Melanchthon’s interesting ideas about the category of relation have left no trace, and true and good are explicitly counted as transcendentals. Resen also deviates from Melanchthon by including the antepredicaments.
Resen divides logic into a pars generalis and a pars specialis, and in so doing he owes a debt to Zabarella, who had counted the doctrine of predicables, categories, propositions and general syllogistic as pars communis, the treatises on demonstrative, dialectic and sophistical syllogisms being the pars propria). But Resen crosses this division with a semi-Ramistic distinction between apprehension and comprehension. Apprehension deals with simple concepts, comprehension with combinations of concepts.
The result is the following:
|
Apprehensio |
Categorica |
Topica |
Pars generalis |
|
|
Prædicabilia |
Categoriae |
Loci |
||
|
Isagoge |
Categoriae |
|||
|
Comprehensio |
diacrisis
axiomatica |
diacrisis syllogistica |
||
|
De Int. |
Priora |
|||
|
Methodus |
Posteriora, Topica, Elenchi |
Pars specialis |
||
|
Ordo |
|
|||
The important feature of this division of
logic is the place given to the loci, on which the humanistic-Ramistic
tradition laid such weight. Dialectical syllogisms belong in pars specialis,
but the loci, i.e. the fundamental relations that link one simple concept to
another, are introduced as a part of the theory of simple concepts, and
immediately after the predicables and categories.
In 1611 doctor medicinæ Caspar Bartholin returned to Copenhagen after several years of studies abroad. He was all of 26 years old, but already had considerable experience in how to become someone in the academic world. With Bartholin the university acquired a pure-bred Neo-aristotelian, who had learned his logic in Wittenberg under one of the new movement’s foremost proponents, Jakob Martini. In 1608 Bartholin published the first version of a handbook of logic that was to undergo several revisions and many reprints in several places – most of them outside Demark.
Bartholin drops Resen’s compromise between humanism and traditional Aristotelianism. He divides logic in the same way as Zabarella, and he takes the Antepredicaments seriously. He is not in doubt about the equivocity – or more precisely: analogy – of being: ens is used equivocally, that is, analogically, of substance and accidents and of God and creatures.
There was a current debate whether Aristotle’s Categories is really a work of logic or of metaphysics. Bartholin is somewhat unclear about the ontological status of the categories, but he is adamant that they do have a foundation in reality. As for which philosophical discipline Aristotle’s work really belongs to, he decides for logic, but mainly because Aristotle himself thought that was where it belonged, and he ought to know what he was writing about.
A similar willingness to bow to tradition appears when Bartholin asks if there must be exactly ten categories. Much like Buridan before him, Bartholin acknowledges that there is no proof whatsoever that the list is the optimal one, but he accepts it all the same, because it is traditional.[19]
A few reminiscences of Melanchthon may be
detectes, as when he explains that “a notio (concept) is a picture or
representation of some thing that the mind has encounters.”[20]
Bartholin’s type of Neoaristotelianism is boring, though he adopts the new fashion of speaking about classes: “The categories are classes of simple beings”.[21] He only rarely provides the standard entertainment of his age, that is, twisting common sense for the sake of theology, and, being a protestant, he can even reject one such twisting to which catholics were committed, and claim that inherence is essential to accident.[22] The interpretation of Aristotle is based on that of the late 13th century, but none of the characteristically medieval contributions to logic is allowed to play a role. Thus supposition is a non-word. Later in the 17th c., some writers tried to recover some medieval theory, but that was only of scarce relevance to Aristotle’s Categories.
The first important attempt to pep up Neoaristotelianism by putting Aristotle’s book to new use was due to the German Georg Gutke (1589-1634), whose theories achieved a break-through in Denmark in the 1650s, a generation after they had first been presented.[23] In the process of pepping up Aristotelianism the Gutkians approached Ramist views on a number of points, but based on different foundations. Their principal aim was to find a way to make logic a really useful hand-maiden of Lutheran theology.
The Gutkians
made the Ante- and Postpraedicamenta the foundation of their logic.
Their main idea was this: the principle of contradiction, “it is or it is not”,
is the foundation of all truth; therefore the doctrine of affirmative and of
negative predication must be the foundation of all logic. The elements of
affirmative predication are presented in the Antepraedicamenta, those of
negative predication in the Postpraedicamenta. From the Antepraedicamenta
the Gutkians focus on the notions of synonymy and paronymy, that is univocation
and denomination in traditional Latin terminology. In predication one wants
either to provide information about the subject’s essence or about something
inessential, yet relevant. In the first case, the predication is synomymous and
the predicate is a genus, differentia or species; in the second case the
predicate is a an accident, whether proper or common, and the the predication
is denominative. In this way the Porphyrian predicables were fitted into the
system of the Anteprædicamenta. The most important Danish Gutkian, the
theologian Christian Nold in 1666 summarizes some of the main points of this
doctrine as follows:
Any term is either consentaneous or
dissentaneous. A consentaneous term is affirmatively related to some other
term. There are two types, the nominal and the real. The former agrees only in
name [with some other term], as is the case with equivocals, whereas the latter
also agrees thing-wise, and is either synonymous and agrees essentially or
paronymous and agrees extra-essentially. [...] A dissentaneous terms is related
negatively to some other term, and is either disparate or opposite; the former
is equally incompatible with several others, as man with sun, moon
and stone; the latter is more incompative with one than with another,
and is either relative, contrary, privative, or contradictory.[24]
For your
information, Nold’s contradictory terms are infinite terms like non-man,
which may be called contradictory to man
because tertium non datur.[25]
Nold is not confusing term-negation with sentence-negation, in fact he
holds that there are no infinite verbs, because in non-currit and the
like we actually have a negation of the copula and not an infinitization of the
verbal content. Regrettably, however, he also considers cold fire, white
blackness, blind seeing and deflowered virgin as instances of
contradictory terms being joined.[26]
The Gutkian
system appealed to Nold and his likes because it offered the prospect of a logica
divina sharing fundamental traits with ordinary logic. Synonymous and
paronymous predication could also be found in the sphere of theology, and even
in the sphere of non-entities.
In fact, Nold’s
logic is ready to deal with all sorts of terms, be they supra-predicamental,
predicamental, or infra-predicamental.[27] All of these fall into ordered
representational classes, within which one can see a super- and subordination
much like in a traditional Porphyrian tree.
The
infra-predicamental realm is populated
by fictive, negative and syncategorematic terms. Among the fictive ones we find not only the
chimera and her close relatives, Papal primacy and the Calvinist decree, but
also all second intention terms and universals in essendo vel afficiendo –
to be carefully distinguished from what had often been called universalia in
prædicando[28]–,
as well as lack of the original image, i.e. the loss of man’s original likeness
to God, and much more.[29]
Supra-predicamental terms are real, i.e. they signify realities. They fall
in two classes, that of the mystical terms and that of the transcendental ones.
The mystical class contains words for the entities peculiar to Christian
theology, such as Sacred Scripture, Word of God, The Persons of the Trinity,
God’s providence and the like, and there is a synonymous
supra-predicamental relationship between God and the three divine
persons, between Law or Gospel and God’s Word, whereas there us a
paronymous supra-predicamental relationship between God and his
attributes, God and man, the Eucharistic host and the body
of Christ.
The
transcendental terms include the highest terms in the three realms of
philosophy: Gnostology, Noology and Ontology – a recently invented
tripartition.
While Nold
thought it important to arrange terms in predicational hierarchies, he was not
too enthusiastic about the Aristotelian categories. He did distribute
predicamental terms over ten categories, but at the same time he taught that
the number 10 has its origin in Pythagorean superstition, and in fact there are
only five accidental categories, namely quality, motion, when, quantity and
relation.[30]
In 1701 a
schoolmaster called Søren Glud (Severinus Gludius) published a brief introduction to logic based on Nold’s
expansive book, This epitome of Nold was standard fare in Danish and Norwegian
schools far into the 18th century. But that was just the usual story about
school-books lagging some generations behind scholarship.
Already in
Nold’s own lifetime the Aristotelian categories were subjected to more scathing
criticism than his. In the 1660s Baconians and Cartesians made their entry on
the Copenhagen scene, and they clearly professed what was perhaps latent in
Nold, and already in John Buridan, as well as in Ramus, namely that only one
type of line of predication is needed, so that all the categories may be
collapsed, or, if more than one line of predication is needed, this will be on
the basis of a totally different ontology.
Not
accidentally, the advent of this new line of thought coincided with the
incipient collapse of Lutheran orthodoxy. Soon logic would cease to be considered
a handmaiden of theology. But if it was not even a necessary auxiliary force to
keep Calvinist and Papist enemies at bay, or if those enemies were no longer
thought to be great threats, what was the use of it?
There was a
hard time ahead for logic, and Aristotelian logic in particular. But we still
talk about the quality of tomatoes.
Bibliography:
Agricola, Rodolphus 1528: De inventione dialectica libri tres, Köln. Rp. Hildesheim 1974 (with the author’s name given as “Rudolph Agricola”).
Bartholinus, Caspar 1625: Logica major, København.
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricencis e Societate Iesu in universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ, Cologne 1607 (rp. Olms: Hilsesheim–N.Y. 1976)
Marmo, Costantino 2003: ‘Types of Opposition in the Postpraedicamenta in Thirteenth-century Commentaries’, in J. Biard & I. Rosier-Catach, La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XVIIe-XVe siècles),. Philosophes Médiévaux 45, Louvain-Paris, pp. 85-103.
Matthiæ, Jacobus. 1590: Doctrina de ratione docendi discendique artes et disciplinas, Basel.
Melanthon, Philippus 1834-60: Opera quae supersunt omnia, udg. af C.G. Bretschneider & H.E. Bindseil, Corpus reformatorum Halle (from 1853 Brunswick).
Noldius, Christianus 1666: Logica Recognita, København.
Norvin, William 1940: Københavns Universitet i Reformationens og Orthodoxiens Tidsalder, vol. 2, København.
Ramus, P. 1581. Scholæ in tres primas liberales artes, Frankfurt (rp. Minerva: Frankfurt 1965).
Valla, Laurentius
[1] Norvin 1940: 30: “Secundus Lector erit Dialecticus. Hie quatuor ordinariis diebus tantum tradat aliquam breuem et planam Dialecticam, qualis est Cesarii, aut absolutior et commodior illa Philippi Melanthonis. Hac absoluta, adiungat elementa Rhethorices, uidelicet libellum Ciceronis ad Herennium, aut potius elementa Rhetorices a Philippo scripta, que his temporibus sunt accommodatiora. His absolutis enarret unam Ciceronis orationem, in qua monstret usum illorum preceptorum, nec addat plures orationes aut autores. Postea statim redeat ad Dialecticam. Hanc enim assidue in Scholis inculcari oportet. Et cogat hic lector auditores ediscere precepta, et inter docendum ab eis ea reposcat. […] Alteram lectionem legat die Lune et Martis, alias Vergilium, alias Ouidii Metamorphosin, alias partem aliquam Liuii.”
[2] Norvin 1940: 31-32: “Quintus Lector Physicus. Hic quatuor ordinariis diebus tradat primum ordine compendium aliquod Physices […] Preterea unus dies et certa hora ei statuatur, ut semel in hebdomada legat ordine totam Aristotelis Dialecticam Grece, ut in Schola ars Methodi et perfecta Dialectica conseruetur. Si uero Grece hoc non potest, legat ex aliqua commodiore translatione Aristotelis latine. Ita tamen ut semper apud sese conferat latina cum Grecis ante lectionem, ne sepe, ut fit, aliena a sententia autoris dicat. Et forte hoc in principio magis proderit, donec Schola possit habere uirum, qui ista Grece tradat.”
[3] Erotemata col. 513: Dialectica est ars seu via, recte, ordine, et perspicue docendi.
[4] 519 Universalia dicuntur, quia sunt gradus vocabulorum communium. […] Species est nomen commune, proximum individuis, de quibus praedicatur in quaestione, Quid sit […] 520 Genus est nomen commune multis speciebus, et praeicatur de eis in quaestione: Quid sit
[5] 520: Tenenda est sententia vera et rectissime tradita a Boëthi: Omne quod est, eo ipso quod est, singulare est, id est: Quaecunque res in natura vere et positive est quiddam extra intellectionem, est singularis per sese.
[6] 526: Quid est Praedicamentum? Est ordo generum et specieum sub uno genere generalissimo, quod aute substantiam, aut accidens aliquod significat, quia tota haec tabella, quae fontinet praedicamenta, est exigua tabella universitatis rerum, distribuit {distribuens scribendum?} substantias et substnatiarum accidentia. Ac si integre explicanda essent praedicamenta, de omnibus naturae partibus dicentum esset. Nunc nuda vocabuloroum series tantum recitatur, quid ipsum tamen utile est, quia discimus, quibus limitibus includenda sit omnis cogitatio, videlicet, ut a summo vocabulo Entis exorsi, posea diversas naturas, vellut ramos consideremus, et quaeramus de re proposita, an sit substantia, aut accidens, et in quo ramo subsantiarum aut accidentium collocanda sit.
[7] 528 Dicuntur autem genera generalissima, id est, summa, quia ab his proxime acceditur ad vocabulum, quod inter omnia in rerum natura priumum est, videlicet Ens. Ut igitur ordo rectius tenerei possit, supra ordines praedicamentorum semper meminereis collocandum esse vocabulum Ens, ut in inquisitione rerum habeat mens quasi metam, ubi resistat. Si enim sine fine vagaretur, fierent incerta et confusa omnia
[8] 528 Substantia est Ens, quod revera proprium esse habet, nec est in alio, ut habens esse a subiecto. Haec definitio communis est Deo, et creatis substantiis.
[9] 528-9 Est ergo satis accommodata definitio: Substantia est Ens, quod habet proprium esse, et sustinet accidentia.
[10] 544
[11] 546.
[12] relationes reales and rationis. 551.
[13] Melanthon 552 “Scholasticus est persona ordinata voluntate Dei, ad discendam doctrinam generi humano necessariam de Deo et de aliis rebus bonis, ne extinguatur noticia Dei inter homines, sed servetur Ecclesia, et multi fiant haeredes vitae aeternae, et servetur disciplina, et habeant homines alias honestas utilitates ex artibus, ut ex Medica curationes morborum, ex Arithmetica computationes, ex Geometria mensuras, ex Astronomia anni cognitionem, et alias utilitates.”
[14] Melanthon 554 Usitate in scholis nominarunt haec vocabula transcendentia: Ens, unum, verum, bonum, quia communia sunt multis praedicamentis, sed verum et bonum recte inter relativa recensentur.
[15] Cæsarius, of whose book Melanchthon approved, had kept the antepredicaments, and in general followed Aristotle much more closely than Melanchthon.
[16] 561 Postquam utcunque exposita est doctrina de praedicamentis, adiecta est commonefactio de paucis quibusdam vocabulis ambiguis, cum multo plura recenseri potuissent.
[17] Matthiæ 1590: 43-44: “logica, quæ ut ait Arist. lib. I. cap. 8. Post. mentis et rationis tantum est. In hac primum est nominum, verboroum homonymorum, synonymorum, paronymorum, adeóque orationis doctrina: quæ doctrina Grammatice propria est, ut ipse Arist. Top. ait: Utile est, inquit, observare quot modis vocabulum accipiatur. Sed hæc de vocabulis consideratio non est propria Dialecticæ. Deinde in Dialectica est doctrina prædicamentorum et inventionum {misprint for intentionum ?} tradita. Est autem Prædicamentum nihil aliud nisi rerum homogenearum per generalis<si>ma, subalterna et specialis<si>ma descriptio. Hæc autem rerum descriptio Dialecticæ propria non est. Est enim talis rerum κατηγορία et descriptio nihil aliud est quàm ars in genere. Ars enim nihil est aliud quam rerum Homogenearum per Genus, genera subalterna et specialis<si>ma, Methodus, comprehensio, dispositio, ordinatio. Sic enim Arithmetica rectè descripta numerorum. Sic Geometria rectè descripta magnitudinum κατηγορία est” I take it that Mathhiæ is here using descriptio in the sense of discriptio. His source is easily identifiable. Ramus, Scholae dial. 4.10, p. 112: “Video autem Categoriam esse categorematum homogeneorum ordinationem et descriptionem per generalissimum, subalterna, specialissima.“ 114: “Sed tamen res intelligatur; sitque Categoria, homogeneorum descriptio per generalissimum, subalterna infima. Quæ categoriæ definitio, nihil aliud est, quám {sic!} artis et scientiæ vera methodo dispositæ definitio: Ars enim, est rerum homogenearum per generalissimum, subalterna, specialissima, comprehensio et ordinatio: Sic Arithmetica numeros, Geometria magnitudines methodicé traditas complectentur{sic!}.” On p. 116-17 Ramus throws synonyms and homonyms out of logic and sends paronyms to the locus a coniugatis in the Topics. Notice that ‘categoremata’ is Ramus’ Greek for ‘prædicabilia’.
[18] Matthiæ 1590: 45: Doctrina igitur Prædicamentorum, i.e. artium omnium Dialecticæ Homogenea non est. Unde est <quod> Rodolphus qui accuratissimè Dialecticam subduxit eam doctrinam, ut non Homogeneam prætermisit.”
[19] Bartholinus 1625: 56r: “Quamvis autem hæc ita facillimè solvi omnia queant, quæ denarium numerum impugnant; tamen non negandum magis numerum hunc ex recepta Philosophorum (Pythagoræorum præcipuè, ut fuit Archistas, quibus solus denarius perfectus) sententiâ et consuetudine constare, quàm firmâ demonstratione.” Cf. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricencis 263: “Peripateticam igitur, & veram sententiam, quæ dena statuit prædicamenta, si quidem præter antiquorum, & recentium Philosophorum autoriatem, euidentiam non habet, vt aliqui falso existimarunt, aliqua ratione confirmemus.”
[20] Bartholinus 1625: 19: “Est autem notio rei imago vel effigies animo objecta.”
[21] Bartholinus 1625: 50: “Incomplexa tantùm pertinent ad Categorias, quæ sunt classes Entium simplicium.”
[22] Bartholinus 1625: 64; “Estque inhærentia de essentia Accidentis, per quam Accidens differt à substantia.”
[23] Gutke was a pupil of Jakob Martini. The first edition of his Logica divina appeared in Berlin in 1626, it seems. The first Danish Gutkian I have found is one Paulus Andreæ Arhusius (Danish: Poul Andersen fra Århus) who in 1651-52 issued a series of twelve disputations under the common title of Exercitationum Logicarum Disputationes.
[24] Noldius, Logica recognita, 1666: 41-46: “ Terminus [...] est consentaneus, vel dissentaneus. consentaneus alium terminum respicit affirmativè: et subdividitur in nominalem, vel realem. ille consentit tantùm secundum nomen, ut æqvivoca: hic consentit etiam secundum rem. et est vel synonymicus, qvi consentit essentialiter; vel paronymicus, qvi consentit extra-essentialiter. [...] Terminus dissentaneus, alium terminum respicit negativè, estque vel disparatus, vel oppositus. ille, cum pluribus pugnat æqvaliter: ut homo cum sole, lunâ, lapide. hic, magis pugnat cum unô qvàm cum altero: et est relativus, contrarius, privativus, vel contradictorius.”
[25] Nold had late 13th-century precedent for classifying infinite nouns as contradictory, as appears from Marmo 2003, but it is unclear whether there is a causal connection.
[26] Noldius 1666: 47: “contradictorius, est inter ens et non-ens; estque vel explicitus, cum additur particula non, ut homo non-homo: vel implicitus, (dictus contradictio in adjecto) qvando tale aliqvis termino tribuitur, per qvod termini essentia evertitur. ut ignis frigidus, alba nigredo, cæca viio, virgo deflorata.”
[27] Noldius 1666: 69: “Ordines Logici differunt à Metaphysicis. Præcipuè latitudine seu objecto, et fine. Ordines Metaphysici exhibent nonnisi ens determinatum: illud enim in disciplinis inferioribus, (qvibus Metaphysica hoc qvod habent assignat) non tractatur. At ordines Logici etiam extendunt se ad non-ens et entia ficta: imò ad mystica, et ad entia in abstractô, qvin et ad modos.”
[28] **check Nold’s terminologi for the second item*
[29] See Noldius 1666: 44 and the table p,p. 110-111.
[30] Noldius, Logica recognita 1666: 80: “Placuit hîc sequi tritam orbitam: propter rudiores. Sed si qvis nostram amat sententiam (fertur enim numerus hic esse ex supersitione Pythagoræ, qvi nihil existivavit perfectum, nisi qvod constaret ex denariô) habebit Classes accidentium nin nisi qvinqve, et illas hoc ordine: Qualitatem, motionem, (actionem et passionem) qvando, qvantitatem, et relationem.”